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Abstract
By looking at the role of ideas in EU policy-making, this article partly contests other explanations on the
evolution of EU RTD policy. Our claim is that the cognitive dimension of policy framing should also be
considered in the explanation, alongside the roles of institutional dynamics and of material conditions.
Bringing ideas back in, we provide a new account of the historical evolution of EU RTD policy, which has
been moving from a frame of science policy to technology policy, and lately to innovation policy. Special
emphasis will be placed on explaining this latest move, as the current ‘innovation turn’ brings about a re-
interpretation of the boundaries between RTD policy and other policies. The conclusion will sum up the
arguments, focusing especially on the current transformations of this EU policy.
 
Introduction
The RTD policy of the European Union has expanded notably from the limited research
actions envisaged in the three Treaties of the 1950s. The introduction of an "overall
RTD policy" in the EC agenda in the late 1970s was associated to the idea of addressing
the technological gap conceived as the major problem for European competitiveness in
world markets. Since the mid-1990s, RTD policy has been gaining saliency within EU
policies, through a re-positioning and incorporation into the basic European policy
frames about sustainable economic growth, employment and social cohesion.
Conventional explanations concerning the development of the EU RTD policy have
mainly focused on the role of interests, through the perspective of national governments,
as a result of the mobilization of private interest (Peterson, 1992; Sandholtz, 1992;
Sharp 1989; Sharp and Shearman, 1987), or   on the entrepreneurial role of the
European Commission (Cram, 1997; Pollack, 1994). One major shortcoming of these
explanations is the lack of attention given to the transformations in the cognitive
dimension of policy formulation. The ideas and arguments about the role of science and
technology in economy and society and the dominant RTD policy frames have changed
significantly. The boundaries of the policy and considerations about the way in which
innovation and technology relate to competitiveness, job-creation, economic growth and
social progress have also changed.
There has been an important transformation in the conceptualization of RTD policy,
which is now articulated into a broader innovation policy (Caracostas and Muldur, 1998
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2or Peterson and Sharp, 1998). This is much more than a new label, in such that
innovation entails a different view on the role of public action in the process of
technological development and its links with economic growth. The 1993 White Paper
on “Employment, Competitiveness and Growth” (EC, 1993) includes some elements of
the new policy frame, although people have identified the turning point for these
changes in the 1995 Commission’s “Green Paper on Innovation”(EC, 1995).Indeed, this
re-framing seems to have taken place in the absence of direct involvement of major
corporate or national interests. How, then, can we explain the new trajectory of EU RTD
policy? And to what extent have the new policy frames reshaped the EU technology
policy set up in the 1980s?
We suggest that an overall explanation of the changes and continuity of the EU RTD
policy since its inception should integrate this cognitive dimension. Therefore, the role
of ideas and policy frames needs to be considered as an additional explanatory factor,
side-by-side with the institutional dynamics, economic constraints or actors’ strategies.
Research on the general role of ideas in shaping preferences or as an explanation of
policy outcomes has developed at a slower pace. Building on analytical traditions from
international relations, policy analysis and political economy  we argue that new ideas,
especially those arranged on policy frames, can orient actors’ preferences in new
directions and contribute to political change. Determining in which institutional
conditions those impacts could be effective is also important.
This article first raises some conceptual and analytical issues about how ideas shape
policy-making processes. The second section re-examines some aspects of EU
technology policy, stressing the cognitive dimension of policy development. In this
context, we will analyze the interaction between the evolution of socio-economic
conditions, the way in which decision makers define their policy preferences and how
new ideas and policy frames contribute to the solutions adopted in changing EU
institutional conditions. The third section will look at recent transformations in EU RTD
policy and its links to innovation policy.
1. The role of ideas in policy change
Public action primarily depends on the preferences of decision makers, but constrained
within institutions. However, preferences are not the simple expression of actors’
interests, because policy preferences are formed in a political context in which ideas and
cognitive models are of relevance1. RTD policy change can be characterised as being an
adaptive reaction (not necessary incremental) to the socio-economic environment in
science, technology and innovation. And changes in policy could be studied through the
transformation of the ideas and models that actors use to construct their specific policy
preferences. Our main purpose is to document the cognitive turns of European S&T
policy and how ideas have shaped policy development in RTD.
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 Interests represent fundamental goals (even if ambiguous) of actors, while preferences refers to the
specific policy choices that actors believe will maximize or satisfy their income, welfare or chances of re-
election (see for example Milner, 1997). Then, policy preferences are shaped by political and economic
situations, institutional environments and dominant ideas.
3Although classical arguments on the relevance of cognitive dimensions come from
Weber and Keynes,2 the conceptual framework is underdeveloped. The traditional
debates about EU politics and policy-making either have disregarded the role of ideas or
have considered them as mere argumentative instruments of actors' interests. However,
ideas are more than argumentative instruments. Ideas also entail cognitive and
normative processes, which provide world views and new understandings from which
policy action might be developed. Traditional arguments that have disregarded ideas
have forgotten the essentially deliberative nature of politics and policy-making (Majone,
1989).
Institutional approaches from political economy and international relations have
contributed significantly to clarifying the conceptual issues associated with the effects of
ideas on policy making. For example, Judith Goldstein and Robert Kehoane (Goldstein,
1993; Goldstein and Kehoane, 1993) develop three basic situations in which ideas could
have an independent effect of on policy: when there is a world vision, a causal model or
a focal point in an equilibrium situation. In the same vein, Peter Hall (1993) explains
policy changes in economic policy using the case of paradigmatic change in economic
theory from Keynesian to monetarist strategies.
Campbell (1998) made an attempt to set up a typology of ideas, based on two
intertwined dimensions of ideas: the normative (ideas consist of values and attitudes)
and the cognitive levels (ideas structuring our knowledge and used as arguments), and
secondly the analytical distinction between the ‘foreground’ and the ‘background’ of
policy deliberation. Paradigms constitute the ultimate abstract base of human and policy
action; they “generally reside in (policy makers’ and experts’) cognitive backgrounds as
underlying theoretical and ontological assumptions about how the world works”
(Campbell, 1998). In this sense, paradigms define the political and policy discourse and
eventually limit the number of solutions available for actors. Campbell uses the term
paradigm in rather Kuhnian terms (Kuhn, 1962): “Some paradigms are more dominant
than others. Important here is the degree to which they are institutionalised within the
leading universities, think tanks, and professional organisations that provide policy
makers with a particular world view” (Campbell, 1998). It is the institutionalisation that
renders a theoretical framework a paradigm in this policy-oriented sense. Problems and
solutions are socially and politically constructed within a framework of coherent
understanding, which constitutes the paradigm.
However, beyond this understanding of paradigmatic change, the typology says little
about the conditions and processes by which ideas become adopted. Public policies are a
product of the relationship between ideas, interests and the forms in which issues are
‘framed’. There is a reciprocal but non-deterministic relationship between actors’
interests and the ideas and frames they use to cope with them. In this context, frames
and interests are logically independent concepts, however, “it is the frames held by the
actors that determine what they see as being in their interests and, therefore, what
interests they perceive as conflicting. Their problem formulations and preferred
solutions are grounded in different problem-setting stories rooted in different frames”
(Schön and Rein, 1994). Action frames operate at different levels of specificity, namely,
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 “Not ideas, but material and ideal interests, (this) directly govern men’s conduct. Yet very frequently the
‘world images’ that have been created by ‘ideas’ have, like switchmen, determined the tracks along which
action has been pushed by the dynamic of interest” (Weber, 1915: 280). “I am sure  that the power of
vested interest is vastly exaggerated compared with the gradual encroachment of ideas” (Keynes, 1935:
383-4).
4policy frame, institutional action frame and metacultural frame3. A policy frame is a
social construction of reality which provides a perspective from which an amorphous,
ill-defined and problematic situation can be made sense of and acted upon (Rein and
Schön, 1991). Frames are rooted in the organisations and institutions that promote them4
and policy conflicts might give rise to disputes between institutional actors who defend
and sponsor conflicting frames. But institutions also provide ‘policy forums’ which
serve as vehicles for a more general debate.
The notion ‘policy frame’ puts its emphasis on the competitive dynamism of ideas. In
some circumstances, competition between policy frames could produce the substitution
of the previous one by a new one. In other circumstances, what we observe is a process
of redefinition of the policy frame or institutional frame as a result of the transformation
of the policy boundaries.
Some actors take the responsibility of producing ideas. When actors are predominantly
allocated in the field of interest, we observe ‘advocacy coalitions’(Sabatier and Jenkins,
1993); when there is a group of actors mobilised around cognitive elements, this is what
has been called ‘epistemic communities’, a “network of professionals with recognised
expertise and competence in a particular domain and an authoritative claim to policy-
relevant knowledge within that domain or issue-area” (Haas, 1992).
It is in conditions of uncertainty where knowledge becomes a key resource (Radaelli,
1995). It is the knowledge-based nature of epistemic communities that provides these
networks of actors with the potential to influence the policy process (Richardson, 1996).
This actor-based approach relates to the role of networks as forums for communicating,
exchanging and producing ideas and influence. Epistemic communities can be seen as
the space where the cognitive process takes place and where ideas (mainly as paradigms,
programs and frames) are formulated.
The notion of epistemic community relates to the role of expertise in policy-making5. It
does so by a rather broad interpretation of who are the experts. From the definition
above it seems that experts are those professionals from different disciplines and
academic backgrounds, who at a certain point get together and constitute an informal
network around a given policy issue.
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 A policy frame refers to the frame that a policy actor uses to construct a specific policy situation. An
institutional action frame is a more general frame which embodies the institution’s prevailing belief
system, images, practices and norms which inform the policy frames of institutional actors. Beyond this
level, there are metacultural frames (Schön and Rein, 1994: 33) which are organised around generative
metaphors and symbols (such as ‘nature’, and ‘equality’).
4
 An example: within the European Commission in relation to science, technology and industrial policy
three DGs [XII (Science, Research and Development), XIII (Information Technologies and
Telecommunications) and III (Industry)] have promoted policy frames which are generally consistent with
those associated with the interests of academics scientists or “high tech” firms.
5
 Some explanations (Dehousse, 1997) have stated the importance of expertise in the EU policy-making
and they related it with some characteristics of the EU institutional structure, such as: First, the
Commission's weakness in terms of internal resources, which makes it dependent on information and
knowledge from external sources. Second, the subsidiarity principle that puts further pressure on the
Commission along these terms; as initiator of the legislative procedure, it has to argue and convincingly
justify new EU initiatives:  that is, in order to justify in rational terms any single new policy move, it is
pressured to come up with theoretically-rich frameworks to sustain its initiatives. And thirdly, experts and
epistemic communities are also used by the Commission as exploratory fields for the acceptance and
reaction to early drafts of EU action.
5Indeed, ideas, frames, institutions and actors are not immune to the material world.
Changes in economic conditions and in the political order might trigger policy
development, the ‘inexorable match of problems’ as Kingdon (1984) mentions.
However, the ability for new material conditions to become a factor for policy change
depends entirely on the interpretative ability of the existent policy frame to provide
convincing solutions to the ‘new’ problems, and on the way in which individual and
collective (material) interests are re-defined accordingly. For example, the creation of
the EU RTD framework program in the early 1980s can be seen as a response to the
uncertainties about the technological competitive position of Europe in the aftermath of
the oil crises. Similarly, the uncertainty about economic growth in an enlarged Europe
with notorious structural disparities and the problematization of high unemployment
rates in the 1990s have induced the search for new solutions in the ‘innovative turn’.
 
2. The cognitive dimension in the evolution of EU RTD Policy.
 The support and promotion of research and technological development became an
European business quite early in the process of Community construction and European
integration. However, the actual RTD policy forms are a contingent result of a complex
evolutionary process; different variables and driving forces have been identified to
account for these changes.
 The conventional explanations of the early European involvement in S&T in the sixties
agree that national governments (and industrial champions) took the initiative in
developing a multilateral RTD program in nuclear energy to cope with the problems of
scale and of competition with the US. The explanation of the new directions and
developments that European RTD policies took in the seventies attributes a significant
role to key individuals in the European Commission and to the mobilization of interest
groups in support of these developments (see: Guzetti, 1995; Mytelka and Delapierre,
1987; Peterson, 1991; Peterson, 1992; Peterson and Sharp, 1998; Sharp and Shearman,
1987; Sharp, 1989)6.
 However, the conventional model of explanation does not help to understand the present
policy turn. How to explain, given the relative stability of the actors in the S&T
environment, first the rhetorical changes and then the redirection of the EU RTD policy
in the nineties? We consider that the new directions of EU policy suggest that ideas and
policy frames, rather than interests, have had a powerful influence in policy
reformulation. To account for both the changes in the rhetoric of EU technology policy,
labeled the ‘innovation policy turn’, and the redirection of European RTD policies that
the 5th Framework Programme represents, consideration is given to the new ideas and
policy frames that have emerged as a result of the activity of expert communities in
S&T policy domain.
 In this section we will describe the onset of the RTD activities and the setting up of the
technology policy in the eighties, including its later institutionalisation; we will apply to
the argument the relevance of ideas and policy frames in order to complement the
explanation of the evolution of European RTD policies. For each stage we will describe
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 Other papers explaining the features and evolution of the S&T policy (Dickson’s (1984) analysis of “the
politics of science” and Elzinga and Jamison (1995) studies of “the changes of agendas in S&T policy”)
are also examples of the use of interest group models.
6actors, contexts, ideas on the relevant problems, policy frames and models of
intervention.
 
 2.1. The early models of European RTD policy.
 The firsts steps for the construction and development of an active policy in research and
technological development were the result of a multilateral initiative7. The main players
were the governments constructing the European Communities, either motivated by
their strategic interest around nuclear energy or by industrial pressure in favor of these
developments. In the 1950s there was a deep seated belief that nuclear energy was the
source of an industrial revolution on its way. European governments and companies
were lagging behind the US. The inception of the European RTD policy has been
interpreted as result of the inter-governmental dynamics motivated by the apparent
needs of scale and technology standards in, at the time, a promising technology. The
basis of European co-operation in the initial years of EURATOM was to do what the
countries could not do by themselves.
 The perceived problem was demanding action, but at the time the repertoire of solutions
was quite limited. In those years, the dominant model of public action in S&T was
direct State intervention. The policy frame adopted in the Communities was quite
similar to the models followed by the member states: the establishment of a big research
center, but in this case a multinational one. Governments delegated the mission of
designing a set of nuclear standards to a group of scientists and a research institution.
The instrument chosen for enforcing these political goals was direct action through the
Joint Research Center (JRC): this model followed the existing frames of public action in
this terrain, the prevailing ‘science policy’ paradigm of the time, based on big science.
The first two EURATOM five-year research programmes emphasised direct research in
JRC facilities.
 However, there was some ambiguity regarding EURATOM’s objectives, which moved
from being an instrument of industrial policy to one of energy policy, and finally to
become a nuclear research organisation (see Guzzetti, 1995, ch. 1). The tension between
the different countries on the missions and activities of JRC, the lack of agreement on
the standards for nuclear technologies and the re-nationalisation pressures in favour of
national activities and industrial champions pushed the JRC into an institutional crisis.
 The nuclear research policy could hardly be considered successful in terms of
accomplishment of S&T objectives, but with the direct involvement of European
bureaucracy in RTD a new (non-national) actor that would play a role in the next stages
of RTD policy development was born. A large European public research-performing
institution with more than 2500 people was consolidated. Later, this large group of
scientists became a source of science administrators for the European Commission.
 Nonetheless, with the crisis of direct implementation of research by the European
institutions as a background, new pressures for developing research collaboration and
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 RTD activities within the three treaties which established the European Communities covered only very
limited areas: coal and steel (through the European Coal and Steel Community -ECSC, 1951, art 55),
agriculture (through the EEC, 1957, art 41), and the most important, nuclear energy (EURATOM, 1957,
art 2, 4-11).
7setting up an European RTD policy emerged at the end of the sixties and the beginning
of the seventies.
 
 2.2 Setting up an overall European technology policy.
 At the end of sixties, an increased concern in European society about its economic
dependence on the US, and the need to develop a ‘European strategy’ emerged (see, for
example, Servan-Schreiber, 1967 or Straus, 1968). The issue of the low level of the
European R&D expenditure in comparison with the US, and the problem of the
technology gap started to dominate the discourse that eventually framed policy-making
in RTD. A transition to a ‘technology policy’ was taking place: no longer was the focus
exclusively on research implementation and big science, but was given to the industrial
collaborative dimension of technological development at European scale8.
 In the seventies, the overall concern of the European Communities was to design a
common trade policy. But at the 1972 Paris Summit many of the new common policies
were born, and specifically, a commitment was made for a gradual implementation of a
common policy with respect to scientific research and technological development9.
 In 1973, three more countries joined the EEC and a new Commission was appointed.
The Commission created a specific Directorate-General for "Research, Science and
Education" setting up the organisational basis for new S&T policy. However, there was
a bureaucratic separation of industrial technology affairs from research and science. This
has produced long term effects of consolidating diverse policy frames, that in fact has
even diversified policy boundaries. We can describe them as: ‘science policy’ (that is
linked to the traditional academic interest which insists on the basic issue of scientific
collaboration), ‘technology-industrial policy’ (as the new form of policy for promoting
industrial development) and ‘information technologies frame’ (a kind of specific type of
frame linked to the critical relevance for the future of competitiveness of IT industries).
 In 1974 the Council adopted a resolution “authorising the planning for a medium-term
Community programme to promote research, industrial development and the application
of information technology”, thus an EU RTD policy10. The focus of the Community
action started to change from in-house research activities to Community ‘indirect
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 European scientific collaboration has been a background idea in EC S&T policy and it could be an
objective in itself.
9
 The development was based on tactics  such as: “Jointly selecting and drawing up of a coherent set of
long-, medium- and short-term objectives and the priorities (...); ensuring the co-ordination of national
policies; determining those projects of Community interest (...); setting up permanent consultative
machinery, through which the Member States can (...) decide on the common (... issues ..); and
determining the resources required (...) and choosing the administrative or technical structures (...)”
(Bulletin of the European Communities, sup 14/73).
10
 The Commission Plan was proposed by the new Directorate and the Cabinet of Commissioner
Darhendorf and was a substitute for an earlier proposal prepared by  Commissioner Altiero Spinelli,
which was not taken up by the Council (see Haas, Williams and Babai, 1977). In opposition to Spinielli
proposal, Darhendorf adopted the principle of Community action just aiming to supplement by collective
means what they could do less well nationally. In fact, the big countries (France, Germany and UK)
imposed quite early the model of “subsidiarity” in European RTD policy, a feature that still is part of the
policy frame today.
8actions’. Initiatives in support of ‘joint R&D’ or ‘research collaboration’ were
demanded to solve the problem of ‘small scale of European firms’11.
 A new European RTD policy frame was emerging. The new policy frame was based on
the development of “incentives” (mainly funding) for RTD actors (especially firms) in
key technologies and was consistent with general changes in OECD countries. The new
forms of action were indirect measures in support of RTD. The European policy frame
started to evolve from direct RTD implementation to incentive RTD implemented by
other actors and it was directly managed and administered by Brussels bureaucracy
through an “internal policy”.
 This process of maturation of the initiatives took some years and the EC RTD policy
was characterised by a weak legal basis. The first decisions to experiment with further
R&D collaboration by Community action were taken by unanimity. The emerging frame
developed a new concept of European RTD policy as programs aimed to develop new
technologies, thus to overcome the handicap of European technologies vis-a-vis the
Americans and the Japanese. The main emphasis was helping firms in the production of
new technologies. However, in those years the main form of action was still research
through the JRC.
 These actions did not add up to any sort of coherent policy and were incidental to
overriding economic objective. There was little institutionalisation, and action was not
based on an established set of rules for RTD policy-making. The process seemed to have
been a perfect example of the ‘purposeful opportunism’ style of policy making. The
basic movement into the new direction has been characterized as a result of “policy
entrepreneurs in the EC” combined with the mobilization of the interests of the twelve
big European information technology companies (see Pollack 1994)12. However, it is
reasonable to characterise it as an amalgam of Commission entrepreneurship, a long
tradition of industrial policies for promoting national champions in member states and a
sympathetic scientific community supporting European research policy.
 From the beginning, the new RTD policy was not a coherent set of actions, but rather an
aggregation of initiatives taken by different (even competing) directorates. But the
principles for a coherent policy in RTD started to develop, and these were the political
outcomes of interaction between different actors' interest, intergovernmental
negotiations, and ideas to tackle the problems identified. The need for unanimous
agreement created the context for ‘stop and go’ development of RTD policy (Sharp,
1989). The co-operation between European countries to meet the challenges was
accepted, but there was still tension between the rhetoric of international scientific co-
operation and the de facto construction of national champions. It was in those years of
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 In 1968, the European Commission made explicit a position on “joint research agreements by firms”,
saying that they did not restrain competition. It was an explicit authorisation to enter into “indirect action”
for RTD collaboration.
12
 Scharpf (1988) provides an alternative explanation to the expansion of the EU agenda, which describes
the basic policy dynamics as a result of the emergence of a transnational “constituency” of policy
specialists in favor of joint spending programmes, ranged against policy generalists in the Finance
Ministries of the member states, who can be expected to oppose greater expenditures of any sort.
9experimentation when the EC defined a set of criteria and operating procedures for
evaluating existing programmes and selecting future ones for Community support13.
 Even when policy action in RTD was limited, a systematic strategy of getting ideas and
policy analysis for the long run was defined. First there was the project “Europe + 30”
and then since 1977 the pilot phase and the different rounds of FAST, which created the
conditions for the development of a “RTD policy analysis community" that was able to
supply new data, studies and ideas for S&T issues in Europe. The bureaucracy created
and sponsored the development of systematic knowledge and policy analysis on the
RTD situation, analysis of the RTD environment (monitoring changes and requesting
new initiatives) and increasing concern about the effects or impacts of the policy actions
already taken (the promotion of RTD evaluation in the early nineties).
 The cornerstone of the new orientation to cope with the competitiveness problem of the
European industry was the initiative taken by the Commissioner Davignon, approved in
December 1982 for a pilot phase, the European Strategic Programme for Research and
Development in Information Technology (ESPRIT). This programme was prompted by
the weakness of European IT industry compared with those in the USA and Japan14. The
experience marked the beginning of the new policy form. It contributed to setting the
principles, objectives and priorities for RTD action in the following years. The approval
of ESPRIT programme is considered especially important for anchoring European RTD
policy to the EC’s economic objectives. In those years there was also scientific activism
in favour of higher involvement by Europe in R&D. However, the advocacy coalition in
favour of expanding the EC’s RTD funding competencies was able to recognise that
there was a competing policy frame (economic development and competitiveness)
which had to be accommodated if the RTD advocacy coalition’s entrepreneurship was
not to be stalled.
 Many (industry-dominated) initiatives were launched, but an internal organizational
commitment was emerging in DGXII to control or “coordinate” the activism of the
industry-oriented units. In this vein, the 1981 Communication from the Commission to
the Council on the Community's research and development strategy for the 1980s
included the proposal that all research activities should be included in an overall
framework programme.15 In fact the emergent proposal of a coherent policy associated
to a framework program could be partially seen as part of Brussels bureaucratic politics,
to guarantee legitimization by the Council. In 1983, during this very active period of
growth in EC’s RTD policy competence, the Council adopted the First Framework
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 E.g. Community involvement should: avoid duplication and promote rationalisation of efforts. Promote
trans-national research, involving issues crossing national boundaries. To focus on project where R&D
costs were high and potential markets were international. Drive to common requirements and international
standards. These principle were later institutionalised as Reisehuber criteria.
14
 The ESPRIT action included some features that were novel to Community programmes at the time, such
as: a) the participation of industry in all stages; b) an emphasis on ‘pre-competitive’ research, involving
generic research of which results were expected to be of widespread applicability; c) at least two
companies (from different Member States) were required to collaborate in each project, with universities
and other research organisations also participating; and d) a contribution by the Community of 50% of
total research costs.
 
15
 However, it took many years to finally incorporate into the Framework Programme almost all EU RTD
activities.
10
Programme for Research and Development (1984-1987)16. On the operative side of the
new policy frame the ‘Reisenhuber criteria’17 were established to provide guidelines on
the type of projects appropriate for Community activity.
 
 2.3 The institutional consolidation of the policy domain
 In the mid-eighties a significant change occurred in RTD policy, because of new
institutional arrangements. The Single European Act18 provided the first specific legal
basis for Community action in RTD. SEA’s main political objective was the completion
of the internal market that became the target of the Delors Presidency, but it also
included some other procedural issues, such as reforms of decision making procedures
and the increasing role of the European Parliament. The Community RTD policy was be
developed through the R&D Framework Programme and specific programmes. The
main purpose of RTD policy for the SEA was “strengthening the science and technology
bases of industry in the Community”.
 Technology policy consolidated in the Community policies as one of several
‘distributive’ policies associated with the emerging issues of the internal market.
However, it must be mentioned that the SEA also set up the principles for some of the
new generation ‘redistributive’ policy actions such as the structural funds (European
Regional Development Fund, etc.) concerning issues of socio-economic cohesion.19
 With the new institutional arrangements, the Second R&D Framework Programme
(1987-1991)20 was designed with much stress on research related to the needs of
industry and the realisation of the Single Market; but the 2nd FP gave also the first
signals of change in S&T policy boundaries and first attempts to upgrade RTD policy
competence by demanding its integration with environmental, social, industrial,
agricultural and economic policies. In a sense, it might be seen as an attempt by the
RTD advocacy coalition to break out of its traditional closed circuit in DGXII and
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 The new First Framework R&D Programme consolidated the trends for change: the proportion of
funding devoted to energy research declined, while research to improve industrial competitiveness rose
from 17% to 32% in three years, and more than half of the total funding was for indirect action rather than
being undertaken by the JRC.
17
 These led to a preference for: a) research conducted on so vast a scale that single Member States either
could not provide the necessary financial means and personnel; b) research which would obviously benefit
financially from by being carried out jointly; c) research which complemented work carried out at a
national level; d) research which contributed to the cohesion of the common market, and which promoted
the unification of European science and technology; as well as research that led to the establishment of
uniform laws and standards. (Guzzetti, 1995).
18
 Signed in February 1986 and entering into force on 1 July 1987.
19
 Even the 2nd FP introduced the new theme (‘social cohesion’) which was encapsulated as a fifth
criterion for Community funding; the criterion referred to ‘research which contributes to the strengthening
of the Community’s economic and social cohesion, as well as to the promotion of its harmonious and
widespread development, while maintaining its consistency with the objective of technical and scientific
quality.’
20
 Sixty percent of programme funding was for industrial research; where information and communication
technologies were the biggest recipients, while the importance of energy declined. More R&D activities
were integrated. A further development during this Framework Programme was a radical reform of the
JRC.
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DGXIII. But also it was a recognition that in the implementation process, RTD policy
frames were seriously challenged by competing frames which were equally embedded
and institutionalised in other parts of the Commission. One example was DG XVI,
responsible for regional policy, which at the end of the eighties started to experiment
with regional innovation policies through STRIDE.
 This strong association of RTD with industrial orientation (and big companies)
produced a reaction from scientific and academic actors. With Ruberti, a former
university professor, as Research Commissioner, the 1989 Aigrain Report of the
Framework Review Board formulated criticisms on the existing FP and suggested more
orientation to the scientific bases of the Community. The report was mainly a reaction
against the dominance of big firms’ interests. This evaluation produced a significant
effect in the new approaches, with the intensification of the general S&T training and
mobility activities as core issues. The Third R&D Framework Programme (1990-1994)
included much more EC R&D activities than the previous FP, with a significant
reduction in the total number of programs.21
 The Maastricht Treaty22 also introduced new reforms. One of the main objectives of the
Treaty was the completion of the Economic and Monetary Union, but it also included
environmental and quality of life objectives to “compensate” the economic growth ethos
of the Community. The Treaty defined EU RTD policy as falling within the EU’s
priority actions (article 3) and marked another major increase in the degree of
institutionalisation of RTD policy at the European level, expanding it from “industrial
competitiveness” to support other objectives defined in the Treaties. Additionally, the
European Parliament, with increased powers, had played an active role in favour of
more RTD policy, with favourable modifications of the EC budget, an area in which the
Parliament has significant powers.
 However, policy creates it own politics (Lowi, 1968) and this could be seen as a side
effect of the new forms of RTD policy. The RTD policy programs approved (such as
IT), adopted the typical form of a ‘distributive policy’ (Lowi, 1972), creating very
rapidly a political game associated with pressure politics (either by national
governments expecting more benefits or from the different clients of the programs) with
different interests producing diverse demands. The vested interest of actors in very
stable institutional environments creates the conditions for very limited policy
innovation. Here is when ideas, policy frames and epistemic communities contribute to
the explanation of the emerging innovation policy turn.
 
 3. The emergent innovation policy frame.
 The cumulative impact of the SEA and Maastricht institutional reforms further
deepened the ‘governance structure’ for EU RTD policy-making. The concerns for co-
ordination and further integration with other EU policies contributed to the emergence
of a new policy frame: innovation. Over time, the innovation frame has enabled the
RTD policy coalition to engage in ‘policy conversation’ (Schön and Rein, 1994) with
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 The share of information and communications technologies actually fell slightly, although it continued
to receive more than half of the funding. Energy research continued to fall, while there was a significant
rise in funding for the area of ‘human capital and mobility’ concerned mainly with training initiatives.
22
 Signed in February 1992 and entered into force on 1 January 1993.
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other policy sectors. Thus the RTD coalition has, therefore, developed a frame which
has a capacity to create synergy with other policy sectors, but at the same time it has the
internal contradiction of interest with some of its members, that have become critical
players in the RTD Framework Programmes.
 After the institutionalisation of EU RTD policy, the Commission initiated a process of
policy change in the mid 1990s. Why has the EC Science, Research and Technology
Directorate suggested a reorientation? The most probable reasons are that the gap in
RTD with the US has not changed significantly as a result of European RTD policy, the
fact that the competitive position of the EU economy and firms has not correlated with
European RTD policy, and the need to reinforce the links of the S&T policy with the
more central European policies such as monetary union, competitiveness, employment
and social and cohesion.
 This policy shift appeared not as a result of the mobilisation of special interest, but as
the by product of a new policy frame in relation to a gradual but remarkable
transformation of the policy paradigm. The forces that pressure the evolution of the
policy are linked to both the emergence of a set of epistemic actors (EC bureaucrats,
academics, policy analysts, consultants, etc.) and to the redefinition of the normative
models of policy intervention. The new policy frames, new ideas or causal models
developed by the policy actors became the dynamic element in the discourse and the
orientation of EU action in S&T.
 Three parallel cognitive developments organisationally supported have been the basis
for the policy turn: Firstly, the work with indicators and policy analysis developed early
within the Commission by FAST, later by MONITOR, SPRINT or INNOVATION;
secondly, the evaluation and monitoring exercises of the RTD Programmes and the
attempts to measure the socio-economic effects of the FP; and thirdly, the analysis of
RTD policy within the OCDE Technology and Economy Programme (TEP). The
normative results of these analytical exercises have converged on the need that more
effort should be put into the use and diffusion of technology and on the need to
approach technology policies from a broader systemic approach based on innovation.
 The impact of the normative statements from TEP had a special relevance, it represented
a plea for moving beyond the supply-side RTD policy towards a demand-side oriented
policy, which would also pay attention to the issue of diffusion. “There is today an
implicit bias in most science and technology policies in favour of the supply and
creation of scientific and technological knowledge and against demand and diffusion of
technology” (OECDb, 1991); the point of departure of the OECD was the observation
that the potentials of technology were under-utilised in economic as well in social terms,
because the economic benefits emerging from the investment in the developments of
new technologies depend more and more on the adequate embedding of technology in
society.
 Similar ideas were already stated in a 1992 Commission Communication to the Council
and the Parliament (Research After Maastricht); issues such as the limits of EU-funded
research, the need to construct linkages with other EU policies, and the arguments in
favour of greater selectivity and concentration of activities. The convergence and the
new combination of ‘frames’ (with other policies) set up the condition for reshaping the
approaches to RTD policy. It should be reminded that within this context DG XII and
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DG XIII produced an influential set of studies and analyses under the FAST/MONITOR
and SPRINT/INNOVATION programs respectively23.
 Furthermore, of central importance in the policy learning process of the European
Commission officers in charge of the initiatives of RTD policy was the systematic
exercises of program monitoring and evaluation, and the attempts to measure the socio-
economic impacts of the EU RTD promotion activities.
 The process of re-drafting the discourse on the overall objectives of the Community
RTD policy passed a landmark in 1993, with the “White Paper on “Growth,
Competitiveness and Employment” (EC, 1993), that endorsed the research role to
support competitiveness in favour of economic growth and employment, and the need to
reinforce RTD efforts. In addition to the traditional mention of needs for improving the
co-ordination between national policies, the White Paper insisted on the need for
collaboration between users and producers in the context of defining research priorities,
and for concentrating efforts. The Fourth Framework Programme (1994-1998) was
approved, but its design did not capture the strategic discussions at the time, showing a
clear continuation of the trends of previous framework programs. The minor changes it
introduced were incremental allocations to particular research areas and limited
attention was given to the emerging issues like technology diffusion, training, or
research in areas of interest for quality of life.
 The consolidation of the new policy frame advanced in the White Paper came with the
“Green Paper on Innovation” (EC, 1995), a crucial document aiming to develop an
overall and integrated strategy around the idea of innovation. Its major objective was to
re-align scattered policy areas and develop a new regulatory framework around the issue
of innovation. After a long process of debate all over Europe, the “First Action Plan for
Innovation in Europe”(EC, 1997) was presented. The novelty of the new policy frame
was that it did not consider additional funding to RTD, but it suggested the re-
organisation of already existing policy areas and the development of new ones.
 Thus the new policy frame was developed by units within the Commission and the
OECD, involving bureaucrats and experts, but where did the normative ideas about
innovation come from? The answer is that there was a significant set of S&T policy
analysts accumulated in some research centres and consultancy companies, whom
contributed significantly to the stock of empirical knowledge available on RTD policies.
In a more disciplinary way, since the mid-1980s, there has been an emerging theoretical
stream in economics studying technological change24, with a new understanding of the
innovation process.
 Unlike the linear model of innovation process which characterises the translation of
scientific production into industrial production as being almost automatic, new
approaches have stressed the social and institutional embeddedness of innovation.
Innovation entails complex forms of learning along codified and tacit forms of
knowledge, and these take place within formal and informal institutional settings that
constitute the complex social, political and economic environments for firms (Lundvall,
                                                
 
23
 A significant example is A Maastricht Memorandum” (Soete and Arundel, eds., 1993), that was
sponsored by the DGXIII under the Sprint program, that again suggests a reorientation of RTD policy
towards a technology diffusion oriented policy.
 
24
 Different labels have been used to identify them, like neo-Schumpeterian, institutionalists or
evolutionists.
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1992). The ‘learning’ and ‘institutional’ dimensions in the new economic understanding
of the innovation process have normative implications for policy design, which are
different to the one provided earlier by neo-classic economics (Edquist and Hommen,
1999; Metcalfe, 1995). From these views a wider and more systemic notion of RTD
policy including human resources, standardisation, patenting, procurement and
competition rules is advocated (Lundvall and Borrás, 1997).
 The gradual development of this new empirical knowledge about S&T policies and  new
normative rationale have had an impact on policy making via the role played by experts
in OECD, national and Commission forums. The communication and dialogue between
experts and bureaucrats has been so close and intense that the new frame has developed
in a rather interactive way25. An emergent RTD or innovation policy epistemic
community could be identified. Once the new ideas have been translated into the
strategic EU documents and declarations, another question emerges: to what extent has
it been viable to put into practice the recommendations about integrating scattered EU
actions? In other words, how far has the new innovation policy frame been
implemented? What are the chances of transforming, not only the discourse of public
action, but also its practice? Asking these questions about the implementation of policy
frames is of paramount importance in order to avoid rationalistic assumptions about
how ideas influence policy development.
 The RTD Framework Programmes involves distributive politics, thus problems may
arise, like the resistance of countries and special interests to radical changes in
objectives, procedures and funding allocations. For example, national representatives
using calculations of the prospective distributive consequences of the new policy
developments usually will try to include ‘priorities’ that correspond to their specific
capabilities creating a shopping basket model of policy action. We should recall also the
strong criticism from an academic perspective made in an editorial of Nature to the EC
proposal for the 5th FP.
 In terms of the bureaucratic politics of the EC we find also barriers that may emerge.
First, barriers related to the consistency of the new RTD policy frame with related policy
frames in fields like competition or regional policy. Second, barriers related to
institutional and bureaucratic resistance from the administrative units whom supposedly
have to re-align their frame of action. The fragmented administrative structure of the
Commission, with various different DGs involved in the definition and implementation
of RTD policy, and other DGs related to issues like SMEs, education, regional policy
and the like, does not per se facilitate the implementation of new guidelines
emphasising co-ordination and synergy26.
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 Economists and policy analyst have benefited from this interaction as much as policy-makers, in the
sense that the later have forced the former to elaborate more on the normative effects of the new
theoretical developments. The policy rationale did not exist as an ex-ante product of the quite abstract
reasoning in academic circles, but rather it is the fruit of a social embedded interaction between academics
and civil servants. The dialogue between experts and EC officials has been about the political construction
of expertise, and about the fluidity in the formation and articulation of ideas that later on become
institutionalised in a new policy frame.
 
26
 In fact today there is not a coherent set of interventions that support RTD policy built up on cognitive
models, but an aggregation of different initiatives with various origins and different strategies that leave
room for policy experimentation.
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 The point is that beyond the fact that some of the reforms of the Amsterdam Treaty
could facilitate the dynamic of change, there are other institutional elements supporting
the continuation of the traditional policy boundaries and the patterns of RTD policy
intervention associated to the distributive politics of RTD policy. The manner in which
the Framework Programme is then institutionalised could even be an obstacle to
changes, because there is a quite successful coalition benefiting from the distributive
policy of the FP - countries, firms, academics, etc.-, in the same way that the
bureaucratic politics.
 European RTD policy has created its own politics with little room for policy innovation.
Conditions of policy innovation usually emerge when there is a persistent perception of
“failure” of the previous policy. However in areas like RTD policy, in which detecting
the effects of the previous policies could take many years, the pressure for change
emerging from analytic point of views need to be complemented with the construction
of new coalitions that could change the balance of the existing vested interest. Will the
changes proposed result in implementation, besides  the interest and existing
institutional arrangements? Will the evolution of the RTD policy be able to select new
modalities of intervention, even though they transform the coalitions supporting it? An
example of the difficulties in implementing substantial and radical change in EU RTD
policy might be found in the new Fifth Framework Programme (1998-2002). Without
denying the novelty of the new framework program design27, our question turns on the
extent to which it has decisively contributed to enforce the new innovation policy frame.
It is currently difficult to say how radical a change the Fifth Framework Programme
represents and how far it is actually contributing to the new policy frame focusing on
innovation. The new organisational flexibility and the emphasis on horizontal public
actions are positive clues in this direction. However, its decisive and really
‘revolutionary’ nature will pretty much depend on its ability to generate synergetic
dynamics with the actions defined in education, industrial, and regional policy fields and
to contribute to the transformation of the historical boundaries of RTD policy28.
 
 4. Conclusions
 We have been describing the evolution of the European Research and Technological
Development policy and studying its dynamics. The traditional explanations insisted on
the relevance of national or special interests, like industry or academics, or on the
entrepreneurial role of the European Commission in an attempt to gain relevance and
power as the European government. However, we have called the attention to the role of
                                                
27
 We can identify some changes. First, there has been a concerted effort to improve objective setting at all
levels, with the use of criteria such as: social aspects (especially employment), economic development
(improving competitiveness), and ‘European added value’. A second novelty is the attempt to further
concentrate and select, with a limited number of programmes and ‘key actions’, and enhancing the flexible
implementation of the programs. And third, there is a general approach characterised as “solving
problems” that subordinates the promotion of RTD activities.
28
 During the preparation of this book, in January 2000, the new Commissioner, Pierre Busquin, has
forwarded a Communication, Towards a European research area, that jumps directly into a basic
restructuring of the European policy in this field aiming to transform the usual distributive debates around
the design of the Framework Programmes into a strategic one.
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cognitive elements and ideas as a key factors to understand the dynamic of policy
change, especially when we consider the innovation turn in EU policy.
 In the nineties the basic structure of European RTD policy actors has become quite
stable, due to the high institutionalisation represented by the Framework Programme in
the RTD policy domain. However significant changes have been detected in the RTD
policy discourse reflecting an adaptive reaction to new elements in the European policy
environment. Economic conditions in the mid-1990s - unemployment, how to secure
growth in an enlarged and very uneven European economy, etc – were in the
background of the policy-makers’ search for new responses and a new policy frames.
Another feature was the acceptance and introduction of metacultural frames into the
policy arena, such as “environmental sustainability”, “societal needs”, etc. But what
have been the forces behind this evolution?
Our suggestion is that the ideas, and the policy frames, which help match problems and
solutions, have played a substantive role; but so has the consolidation of a epistemic
community around the issues of RTD policy. The Green Paper on Innovation
accumulated significant elements brought about by recent theorising in the economics of
technical change and the social shaping of technology, and incorporated significant
knowledge emerging from the evaluation of European RTD and S&T policies. In this
sense, the document serves as an expression of a new re-framing process which has
involved an interactive learning between the Commission officials, external experts
(academics and consultants), and policy makers from other countries.
The changes can be explained, partly as a result of the policy developments: institutional
continuity fine-tuning through internal exercises of evaluation and learning within the
institutional dynamics of EU RTD policy, and partly as a result of new analytical
approaches and theoretical frameworks and the interactive generation of ideas between
the experts and officials in the different deliberative forums provided by the OECD, the
EU Commission, and the other policy arenas.
The new discourse about innovation is nowadays consolidated within the conventional
Commission RTD policy rationale. However, the attempts to implement the new policy
frame in the 5th Framework Programme have not been fully successful. Generally
speaking, when the rhetorical changes moved towards implementation, some academic
interest started to resist the new policy frame. This shows that if the new innovation
policy frame succeeded in the second half of the 1990s is because it remained more at
discursive level and it has not substantially challenged the material interest benefiting
from the funding by the present EU RTD policy.
Further empirical research about the implementation of the innovation agenda is needed
in order to explore the reality of such turn, and its impact on the political objectives it
pursues, namely, competitiveness and employment. But we could expect that to
implement the innovation policy turn in a consistent way a new advocacy coalition of
interests would be constructed and, at the same time, further pressures blurring the
traditional boundaries of RTD policy would be made at the European level.
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